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In the EU, competition policy is based on three main pillars: antitrust, merger control and 
monitoring state aid. Our analysis focuses on antitrust policy. In this context, the Commission 
is concerned about restrictive agreements and practices that imply an abuse of market power. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the main criteria used by the Commission when 
deciding on anti-competitive practices. In particular, our goal is to determine whether and to 
what extent the Commission takes into account economic analysis when deciding if anti-
competitive behavior has taken place. The literature on industrial organization is very extensive 
and provides the theoretical and empirical background that associates industry features and the 
likelihood of practices that restrict competition. However, the literature evaluating the decisions 
by the competition authority is much scarcer and has focused mainly on the analysis of merger 
policy. Our paper attempts to fill this gap. To do so, we examined nearly 2000 cases submitted 
to the Commission for its consideration from January 1999 to February 2004 with the aim of 
determining which industry characteristics led the Commission to rule against the firms 
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The task of ensuring there is free competition in the European Union (EU) has been entrusted to 
the European Commission by the Member States. Hence, the Commission, and more precisely 
the Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp), monitors and investigates suspected 
breaches of competition law. The Commission may prohibit certain conduct by firms and 
impose conduct restraints and fines on the firms found guilty of anti-competitive practices. In 
the EU, competition policy is based on three main pillars: antitrust, merger control and 
monitoring state aid. Our analysis focuses on antitrust policy. In this context, the Commission 
is concerned with restrictive agreements and practices that imply an abuse of market power. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the main criteria used by the Commission when 
deciding on anti-competitive practices. In particular, our goal is to determine whether and to 
what extent the Commission takes into account economic analysis when deciding if anti-
competitive behavior has taken place. The literature on industrial organization is very extensive 
and provides the theoretical and empirical background that associates industry features and the 
likelihood of practices that restrict competition. However, the literature evaluating the decisions 
by the competition authority is much scarcer and has focused mainly on the analysis of merger 
policy. Our paper attempts to fill this gap. To do so, we examined nearly 2000 cases submitted 
to the Commission for its consideration from January 1999 to February 2004 with the aim of 
determining which industry characteristics led the Commission to rule against the firms 
investigated on antitrust grounds. 
Coate and McChesney (1992) looked at 70 merger cases analyzed by the Federal Trade 
Commission and found that barriers to entry were an important factor when it came to blocking a 
merger, whereas the likelihood of future collusion was not. They concluded that many mergers 
were likely to be approved even above the critical level of concentration indicated in the “Merger 
Guidelines”. In a similar study in the UK, Weir (1993) used a probit analysis to determine whether 
efficiency reasons were the main considerations taken into account by the UK Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC). The author found that a key element for blocking a merger bid was 
an expected decrease in competition. However, when he tried to determine what regular sources 
of competition were taken into account by the MMC, he found great variability and concluded 
that the authorities were following a case-by-case approach. Khemani and Shapiro (1993) looked  
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at the decisions of the Bureau of Competition Policy in Canada. Using a probit model, they 
concluded that concentration and market share were the most important determining factors of 
the Bureau’s decisions, followed in importance by input competition and barriers to entry. Davies 
et al. (1999) used data from 73 reports from the MMC. By applying a probabilistic model, the 
authors found that the market share of the investigated firm was one of the main factors that 
determined the MMC’s decision. Their results also suggested that one could predict the result of 
the MMC’s decisions with considerable accuracy. More recently, Bergman et al. (2003) looked at 
the European Commission’s merger decision process and showed that the probability of deciding 
against a merger increased with the parties’ market shares. 
The paper is arranged in 6 sections. Section 2, after this introduction, provides background on 
the antitrust policy of the EU. Section 3 develops and explains the methodology in detail. 
Section 4 discusses the variables which are key determining factors of the likelihood of 
infringements of Articles 81 and 82, as well as their empirical measures. This section also 
discusses other variables to be used in the econometric analysis. The results are presented in 
section 5 and section 6 contains the conclusion. 
2. Background 
In order to apply antitrust regulation, the European Commission refers to Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty of the European Union (henceforth, EU Treaty), which prohibit restrictive agreements 
between undertakings, concerted practices to restrict or distort competition in the common 
market and abuses committed by undertakings holding a dominant position.  
Article 81 deals with cartels and tacit collusion (explicit and non-explicit agreements between 
firms whose aim is to restrict competition by means of delineation of markets, agreements not 
to reduce prices, etc.). It also deals with agreements between firms with the purpose of 
undertaking joint activities such as R&D, sharing production facilities, joint ventures, etc. 
Hence, this article refers to both horizontal and vertical agreements and also includes 
agreements on matters such as price fixing and market sharing, and agreements that limit 
production, etc. It is commonly accepted in the economics literature that horizontal agreements 
are generally detrimental for social welfare, while this does not necessarily have to be the case 
for vertical agreements, which often contribute to enhanced efficiency. In order to take into 
account the fact that some agreements may be welfare enhancing, the Commission has 
introduced some block exemptions for Article 81. These exemptions describe the conditions that 
certain agreements must satisfy to be allowed under Article 81. Current block exemptions refer 
to activities such as technology transfer and franchising agreements, and others refer to specific 
sectors (transport). 
Article 82 prohibits abusive behavior. It includes practices such as price discrimination, tying 
and bundling, predation, exclusive dealership, exclusive territories and resale price 
maintenance.
1 One can find efficiency justifications for introducing many of the practices 
contemplated under this article, but all of them can be used by dominant players to reduce 
competition in the marketplace, particularly in vertical and related markets. 
                                              
1 Note that other practices, such as price squeezes, can be understood as a combination (price discrimination and 
predation) of those included above.  
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Until recently, the procedural rules
2 implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty provided 
for three ways of initiating action. Firstly, individuals and bodies corporate who claim a 
legitimate interest may ask the Commission to take action against an agreement or a practice 
(complaints). Secondly, the Commission may take action on its own initiative (ex-officio 
procedure). Finally, the Commission can be informed of agreements and practices by at least 
one of the parties concerned. This notification system has been discontinued.
3 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Econometric Specification 
The goal of this paper is to examine the Commission’s decisions on anti-competitive practices 
and to determine whether they are consistent with economic analysis. The paper is based on a 
probabilistic model that uses a cross-section of industries and their characteristics to analyze 
the probability of the Commission determining that a behavior that breaches the antitrust 
legislation has taken place in a particular industry i. To do so, we considered two types of 
industry characteristics: first, those that, according to the economic literature, should have an 
impact on the probability of anti-competitive behavior. Second, those characteristics that might 
affect the Commission’s decisions but do not have an economic justification (they may be 
politically motivated, for instance). The dependent variable in our model is the decision reached 
in the cases examined by DG Comp. As we shall see, this poses a methodological problem since 
using Commission decisions as observables may create a sample selection bias which should be 
taken into account.  
For each potential antitrust practice (such as collusion, predatory pricing, tying, etc.), there is 
extensive theoretical literature on industrial organization indicating the industry characteristics 
X1, X2,…, Xn that make its occurrence more likely. Examples of such industry features are the 
concentration of the industry, the existence of barriers to entry, market transparency, demand 
growth, etc. Hence, our goal was to use the theoretical predictions provided by the literature to 
specify and estimate a limited dependent variable model, where the probability Pij of detecting 
anti-competitive practices in industry i and case j was modeled as a function of a set of 
industry i characteristics Xi and case variables Cj, such as the legal basis used, the type of anti-
competitive practice that might have taken place and the application of possible exemptions: 
        Equation 1 
where F is the cumulative probability function, Xi are industry variables that determine the 
likelihood of an infringement, Cj are case-specific variables and α, β and γ are parameters.  
If equation 1 is estimated using a probit model, the specification becomes: 
                                              
2 Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 207. 
3 The Council adopted a new Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Council Regulation (EC) 
Nº. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002). This regulation replaces Regulation 17/62 and came into force on 1 May 2004. For 
the purpose of this document, the main change in the procedural rules is that the new regime ends the notification 
system. 
  ) ( γ β α j i ij C X F P + + = 
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       Equation 2 
 
where uij is normally distributed.  
The specification of such a model will, of course, face an intrinsic difficulty, since anti-competitive 
practices are not directly observable. There is dependent variable yij, which is observable and takes 
value 1 or 0, depending on whether or not an anti-competitive practice is detected by the 
Commission, and an unobservable variable y*ij, which is determined by α+X i β+C j γ +uij. It is 
therefore assumed that yij = 1 whenever y*ij ≥ 0; otherwise yij = 0. To estimate Equation 2, we used 
data on the cases examined by the European Commission (EC) between January 1999 and February 
2004. The information was supplied by the EC. For all the cases examined by the Commission we 
had information on the resolution, indicating whether or not there was a breach of Articles 81 or 
82, information on the cause of the infringement (i.e. cartel, vertical agreements, abuse of a 
dominant position, etc.), and information on the legal basis for the case (Article 81 of the EU Treaty 
and others). The variables in C were case-based and included the characteristics of the decision 
made by the Commission and the nature of the case under examination. In particular, it included 
the legal basis used for the case and the type of practice that took place, as assessed by the 
Commission. These two variables are discussed in more detail in section 4.1. 
3.2. Sample Selection Bias 
Using only the data on Commission’s decisions to evaluate how these decisions were affected 
by industry characteristics raised a potential problem: we did not use any information on the 
cases that had not been examined by the European Commission. We only observed the cases 
that were investigated and we knew whether or not anti-competitive practices had been found. 
There may very well have been situations in which the Commission decided that there was a 
competition infringement, but the case was never examined, and this problem may be 
particularly acute in some specific industries. In fact, it is by no means clear that a particular 
case j in a given industry i was chosen at random. This situation corresponds to the existence 
of a sample selection bias problem that can be summarized as follows. 
Let’s assume the Commission takes into account industry characteristics Xi when deciding to 
investigate a particular industry. However, it does not know the parameter vector β from 
equation 1 and it is likely to take other variables into consideration and possibly miss some of 
those included in X. For example, it may consider variables such as industry size and other 
indicators of economic relevance. We can therefore model the probability that a particular 
industry will be investigated by the Commission as follows:  
   Equation  3 
where vector W of industry variables may include part of vector X and Qi is the probability that 
an industry will be investigated. The non-observable variable z
*
i is determined by (Wiδ + vi), 
where vi is a random term, while observable variable zi takes value 1 when an industry is 
investigated and zero otherwise.  
Not taking into account this sample selection bias leads to non-consistent estimates of β, to the 
extent that variables not included that influence the decision to investigate are correlated with 
other missing variables that explain the likelihood of detecting anti-competitive behavior, 
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normal distribution with variances σu, σv and covariance ρ. To solve this problem, we followed 
Heckman
4 (1976). The Heckman correction is widely used in the economic literature and 
basically provides us with an estimator of a “corrector” for the sample selection bias. We used 
information on the cases for which there was no follow-up from the Commission (and hence, 
no decision) in order to determine if any selection bias existed and to correct for it if this was 
the case. 
4. Data 
4.1. Commission Decisions 
As stated in the previous section, the dependent variable of our study was a binary variable 
that took the value of 1 if a practice that breached Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty had been 
detected by the EC in a particular competition case, and 0 otherwise. All cases within the same 
industrial sector (measured at the three-digit level following the NACE rev.1 codes) shared the 
same industry characteristics, and case-specific information was used to determine other 
relevant information about the nature of the business behavior under examination. 
To measure the dependent variable, we used data from the cases examined by the European 
Commission from January 1999 to February 2004. The data was provided directly by the EC 
and, for all the cases that were examined, it contained information on the resolution of the case 
(indicating whether a practice that breached the above articles had taken place), the legal basis 
of the decision (Articles 81, 82 and others) and the kind of infringement that took place (e.g., 
cartel practices, exclusive purchase, selective distribution, etc.). We had information on 993 
cases that had been examined by the Commission, and 998 additional cases that had not been 
followed up. These 998 cases included ex-officio procedures where the complaint had been 
withdrawn, the notified agreement or practice no longer existed, and the Commission had 
decided to stop the procedure for unstated reasons (238 cases). There was great variability in 
the number of cases examined by industry and in terms of the decisions of the Commission. 
Due to data-availability restrictions with regard to industry-level data, we focused our analysis 
on manufacturing industries, banking and telecommunications. Hence, we limited our study to 
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The advantage of using this data is that it is a unique source of information on the anti-
competitive practices that have been detected by competition authorities. As mentioned in the 
methodology section, the main potential problem is the possibility of a sample selection bias. 
This problem occurs if there is some bias in the cases or industries “selected” by the 
Commission to be examined. If this is the case, it is likely to affect the estimates of the 
determining factors of anti-competitive conduct. For example, if the Commission used variables 
in its selection process such as the past occurrence of anti-competitive behavior in a given 
industry, or the size of the industry, this could lead to (upward) biased estimates of the 
determining factors of anti-competitive conduct which were positively correlated with these 
factors. Potential sources of bias and, therefore, of regressors for the sample selection equation, 
could be the size of the industry, the extent of intra-EU trade in the industry or the historical 
evidence (i.e. the sectors in which previous infringements had been detected). We used the data 
from the cases in which there had not been a follow-up to determine and correct any sample 
selection bias using the two-equation Heckman selection model outlined above. To do so, the 
sample selection equation had to include at least one variable that strongly affected the 
decision to investigate but not the likelihood of finding anti-competitive behavior. 
The cases under examination were classified in 15 different categories (see Table 1) according 
to whether or not a breach of the competition rules had been established, whether the decision 
had been a formal one, and whether any fines or obligations had been imposed on one or more 
of the firms involved. A final distinction between decisions of the Commission was that they 
may or may not have been published.  
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Table 1 





























On the basis of the facts presented, the Commission has to decide whether or not a certain 
practice breaches the competition rules. If the Commission comes to the conclusion that there 
are grounds to take action under Articles 81 or 82, it can then issue a formal decision or an 
informal one. Alternatively, the parties involved may decide to settle. In a formal decision, the 
Commission will prohibit the practice and may impose monetary penalties (fines) for the 
violation of the competition rules. The Commission issues informal decisions for actions that 
breach Articles 81 and/or 82 by means of an administrative letter or a discomfort letter (issued 
as an informal warning from the Commission). When the Commission decides that there are 
reasons to take action, this corresponds to a finding of anti-competitive behavior (see Table 1) 
and the dependent variable of the regression analysis takes the value of 1.  
Alternatively, after examining the facts, the Commission can decide that there is no reason to 
take action. This can be due to two possible reasons: because the practice under examination 












Reasons to take action
Formal decision
Formal decision prohibition with fines 44 25 YES
Formal decision prohibition without fines 11 6 YES
Informal decision
Administrative letter. Minor community interest 32 17 YES
Discomfort letter 24 13 YES
Settlement




Formal decision exemption with obligation 14 4 YES
Formal decision exemption without obligation 24 6 NO
Informal decision
Comfort letter exemption with publication 14 7 NO
Comfort letter exemption without publication 98 58 NO
Comfort letter. Group exemption 34 23 NO
Total 184 98
No reason to take action
Formal decision
Formal decision. Rejection of complaint 78 36 NO
Informal decision. Negative clearance 9 7 NO
Informal decision
Negative clearance without publication 270 133 NO
Negative clearance with publication 36 17 NO
Rejection of complaint without decision 245 104
Total 638 297












Reasons to take action
Formal decision
Formal decision prohibition with fines 44 25 YES
Formal decision prohibition without fines 11 6 YES
Informal decision
Administrative letter. Minor community interest 32 17 YES
Discomfort letter 24 13 YES
Settlement




Formal decision exemption with obligation 14 4 YES
Formal decision exemption without obligation 24 6 NO
Informal decision
Comfort letter exemption with publication 14 7 NO
Comfort letter exemption without publication 98 58 NO
Comfort letter. Group exemption 34 23 NO
Total 184 98
No reason to take action
Formal decision
Formal decision. Rejection of complaint 78 36 NO
Informal decision. Negative clearance 9 7 NO
Informal decision
Negative clearance without publication 270 133 NO
Negative clearance with publication 36 17 NO
Rejection of complaint without decision 245 104
Total 638 297
Total Commission decisions with follow-up 993 492 
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Block Exemption Regulation (BER) or under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. This article provides 
for the exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) for some agreements if they 
create enough benefits to outweigh their anti-competitive effects. The BER provides for 
conditions under which certain types of agreements are exempted from the prohibition in 
Article 81(1). Examples of block exemptions include car-distribution agreements and 
technology-transfer agreements. 
The BER also provides for automatic exemption from Article 81(1) for vertical agreements that 
involve companies with a market share of less than 30%.   
If the Commission concludes that there is no reason to take action because no anti-competitive 
practice has taken place, it can either reject the complaint or issue a negative clearance either as a 
formal decision or informally. If it concludes that the practice under examination is subject to an 
exemption, the Commission can also communicate this formally or informally, using a comfort 
letter (administrative letter sent to the parties involved, confirming informally that the Commission 
sees no grounds for action). Table 1 provides a list of the classification of Commission decisions in 
terms of their formal treatment. The third column of the table corresponds to the dependent 
variable, a binary variable that takes the value of one if an anti-competitive practice has been 
detected and zero otherwise.  
Note that we codified the cases in which an exemption had been applied as zero. Whenever an 
exemption was allowed, we assumed, as we had been doing all along, that the Commission had 
correctly ascertained that the practice under investigation did not pose a threat to competition, 
which was precisely why the exemption was granted, i.e. because any possible competitive 
concern was outweighed by other efficiency gains. The only exception to this rule
5 was the case 
of formal exemptions from obligations, since in that case it was assumed that the imposition of 
obligations indicated a breach of the competition policy rules. 
Finally, 813 out of the 993 cases also contained information on the type of agreement or 
practice that had been the subject of the examination by the Commission.
6 We found 
44 different types of practices as classified by DG Comp (such as agency agreements, patent 
licenses, franchising, etc.) that could be classified in three categories. The first included 
horizontal agreements that were considered in all circumstances to be detrimental to consumer 
welfare. Cartels, trade associations and market-sharing agreements are examples of this type of 
horizontal practices. The second and third groups of practices included actions that were also 
anti-competitive, but could be justified on the grounds of efficiency gains under certain 
circumstances. These practices were either horizontal or vertical. We distinguished between 
practices involving several firms (such as exclusive distribution, franchising and joint ventures) 
and practices where only one firm was involved, which came under the heading of abuses of 
dominant position (like exclusive purchase and refusal to deal). Most of the practices with 
efficiency justification could have been prosecuted under Article 81 and Article 82. Table 2 
presents a complete list of the practices found.  
                                              
5 We were advised by Commission officials to classify this case as 1. Moreover, using a different rule for this group 
of decisions would not change the results significantly, since it was a very limited number of cases.  
6 Of the 993 total cases analyzed by the Commission, 683 contained information on both the industry (3-digit Nace) 
and the type of practice. Only 492 of them corresponded to manufacturing industries, financial intermediation 
(NACE-3: 651 and 652) or telecommunications (NACE 3: 642).   
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With this classification, a practice belonged to only one of three mutually exclusive categories: 
a practice was either horizontal without an efficiency justification, vertical or horizontal with 
an efficiency justification, or an abuse of dominant position. Considering these broad general 
categories made sense in terms of the analysis of the relevant industry determining factors, but 
it also had an additional advantage: in some instances, more than one practice had been 
reported for the same case. 24% of the cases had been reported with more than one anti-
competitive practice considered by the Commission and only 4.9% of them had been reported 
with more than 2. In particular, there were five practices, labeled as “pricing”, “other abuses”, 
“other forms of cooperation”, “beer supply” and “rebates and discounts”, where the coding 
could correspond to either a horizontal practice with no efficiency justification or a practice 
that could be efficiency enhancing. Since it was impossible to determine which classification 
these cases referred to, we used the other practices reported for the same case as a reference and 
classified the five former ones based on the category of the co-practices for the relevant case. 
 
Table 2 


















*When these practices were reported, in most cases they were another practice. We involved them on the basis of the classification 
of the additional practice reported. 
++These exemptions applied to certain vertical agreements and hence the corresponding cases were considered cases where the 








Crisis cartel Vertical relation
Other cartel practices Trade-mark licences Reg. 1400/02 on distribution and servicing of
Trade association Patent licences motor vehicles
Agency agreement Copyright licences Reg. 1475/95 on motor vehicle distribution
Specialization agreement Know-how licences Reg. 4056/86 on maritime transport
Market-share agreement Other IPR licences Reg. 823/00 on maritime transport
Information exchange Selective distribution Reg. 3975/27 on air transport
Exclusive distribution Reg. 1017/68 on transport by rail, road, etc
Control of distributors Reg. 2790/99 on exclusive purchasing
Franchising Reg. 2790/99 on franchising++
Vertical agreements between Reg. 2790/99 on exclusive distribution++
different competitors Reg. 3932/92 on insurance++





One firm involved (Abuse of dominant
position)
Special cases Refusal to deal
Beer supply* Exclusive purchase
Other forms of cooperation* Other purchase agreements
Pricing* Technology-transfer agreement
Rebates and discounts* Boycott
Other abuses* Other sales conditions
Horizontal practices without
efficiency justification




Crisis cartel Vertical relation
Other cartel practices Trade-mark licences Reg. 1400/02 on distribution and servicing of
Trade association Patent licences motor vehicles
Agency agreement Copyright licences Reg. 1475/95 on motor vehicle distribution
Specialization agreement Know-how licences Reg. 4056/86 on maritime transport
Market-share agreement Other IPR licences Reg. 823/00 on maritime transport
Information exchange Selective distribution Reg. 3975/27 on air transport
Exclusive distribution Reg. 1017/68 on transport by rail, road, etc
Control of distributors Reg. 2790/99 on exclusive purchasing
Franchising Reg. 2790/99 on franchising++
Vertical agreements between Reg. 2790/99 on exclusive distribution++
different competitors Reg. 3932/92 on insurance++





One firm involved (Abuse of dominant
position)
Special cases Refusal to deal
Beer supply* Exclusive purchase
Other forms of cooperation* Other purchase agreements
Pricing* Technology-transfer agreement
Rebates and discounts* Boycott
Other abuses* Other sales conditions 
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For the rest of the situations where more than one practice was reported, most could be classified in 
the same general category. Only ten of the cases reported practices that could be classified in two 
different groups.
7 
Finally, the last column of Table 2 includes the existing types of block exemptions. As 
previously discussed, exemptions were not considered a third type of practice. Rather, this 
heading covered cases in which the benefits of a practice outweighed its potential anti-
competitive effects. We also included them in Table 2, because in some cases a certain practice 
was only classified according to the exemption that applied to it. We were able to use the type 
of exemption to approximately determine the kind of practice the Commission was considering. 
This was the case with exemptions on exclusive distribution, technology transfer, exclusive 
purchasing and franchising. 
4.2. Explanatory Variables 
In this section we will discuss the explanatory variables that determined the probability of 
detecting anti-competitive practices and those that determined the selection of the sample. The 
probability of deciding against an anti-competitive behavior depends on case-specific and 
industry-specific variables. As indicated in the methodology, the selection of industry variables 
was based on the long tradition of the industrial organization literature in this area. For each 
potential antitrust problem we turned to the theoretical and empirical literature to determine 
the industry-level conditions under which such violations were most likely to occur. We then 
used suitable quantitative proxies for these conditions as our explanatory variables.  
The regressors used in the sample selection equation included those defined in the literature, 
plus a set of additional variables that took into account the administrative context in which the 
Commission had implemented competition policy in the period under consideration. 
4.2.1. Case-Specific Variables 
As indicated in the methodology section, we included the type of practice that had taken place 
as a control factor in the model. We also included other case-specific variables related to the 
firms involved in each particular case (e.g., firm size and market share). However, this 
information was not in the database and could not be included in the analysis.  
 
Type of Practice (EFF and ADP) 
We included dummy variables that took into account the type of practice being considered in 
each case. In particular, we considered the three mutually exclusive categories defined in the 
previous section. We distinguished between horizontal agreements with no efficiency 
justification, vertical and horizontal agreements with efficiency justification and abuses of 
dominant position. We included a binary variable (EFF) that was equal to one if the practice 
was a vertical restraint or a horizontal agreement with efficiency justification; otherwise, this 
value was zero. Similarly, another binary variable (ADP) was given the value of 1 whenever a 
                                              
7 We ran our regressions with and without these ten cases and no major differences were found.  
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practice fell under the heading of abuse of dominant position. Horizontal practices with no 
efficiency justification were the excluded category. 
As we shall see when discussing the main industry characteristics to be considered, the 
literature on industrial organization provides us with a set of relevant industry explanatory 
variables to determine the existence of anti-competitive practices. These relevant factors do not 
differ that much for different types of anti-competitive behavior. However, these same 
explanatory variables can have a different impact, depending on the kind of practice being 
considered. For instance, in general, one would expect practices where efficiency considerations 
are important to be less likely to lead to a finding of anti-competitive practice, given industry 
characteristics. The inclusion of EFF and ADP dummies allowed us to take this factor into 
account. In particular, we expected these dummies to have a negative effect on the probability 
that an anti-competitive practice had taken place. Moreover, in some cases the industry-level 
determining factors had an opposite effect when we were considering practices that could also 
have an efficiency-enhancing justification compared to when we were considering horizontal 
agreements. To capture this, these binary variables interacted with some of the explanatory 
factors. 
This treatment of the dummies was equivalent to having three different regressions, one for 
each type of practice. 
4.2.2. Industry Variables 
The goal of our analysis was to study the decisions of the European Commission regarding 
antitrust practices and to determine whether they were consistent with economic fundamentals. 
Hence, we followed the existing literature on the economics of industrial organization and 
competition policy to determine the main industry characteristics considered relevant when 
analyzing the main ways in which competition could be threatened. On this basis, as advanced 
in Table 2, we first grouped the practices that breached Articles 81 or 82 of the EU Treaty in 
three main groups: 
-  Horizontal agreements, which usually restrict competition and reduce welfare (in 
our econometric specification, this was the benchmark case). 
-  Vertical agreements whose benefits outweigh their anti-competitive costs 
(determined by the EFF dummy).  
-  Potential abuses of dominant position that have an efficiency-enhancing 
justification (captured by the ADP dummy). 
Second, the last two sets of practices were only considered a problem for competition policy 
when they had a negative effect on welfare.
8 The literature shows that none of these practices 
in itself is judged to be clearly against the public interest. For this to be the case, there has to be 
a certain abuse of individual market power (Article 82) or collective market power (Article 81) 
that restricts competition substantially, in excess of any potential efficiency gain derived from 
the practice or vertical restraint. Since individual or collective market power is a necessary 
                                              
8 As indicated in the background section, this is the spirit of the regulation and many exemptions have been 
included to take this into account.   
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condition for the existence of anti-competitive behavior in the case of dominant positions and 
vertical restraints, it is clear that the set of explanatory variables that determines the existence 
of both types of practices will not differ that much. In fact, we used the same econometric 
specification for all anti-competitive practices, with some minor adjustments which affected 
only a few of the explanatory variables.  
The main industry-level explanatory variables we included in the econometric analysis were the 
following: concentration, asymmetry of firms, barriers to entry, product differentiation, demand 
growth and trade exposure. A summary of the data used is presented in Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
Concentration (CONC):  We expected concentration in the market to positively affect the 
probability that an industry presents anti-competitive practices or agreements. The more 
concentrated firms are in the market, the easier it is for them to collude or for one of them to 
abuse its market power. Concentration is measured as the production of the five leading firms 
in the industry as a share of total EU production.  
Asymmetry Between Firms (ASYM): The more asymmetric the firms, the less likely it will be for 
them to collude. The more different the firms, the more difficult it will be for them to agree on 
a common pricing policy. Moreover, given a collusive price, the incentives to deviate for the 
low-cost firms (or those that offer a higher-quality product) are much higher. Finally, when 
firms are not very similar, it becomes very hard for them to identify any deviation from the 
collusive behavior. Therefore, the probability of being caught if a firm deviates from the 
agreement is lower. This reduces the likelihood of cooperative agreements. It must be noted, 
however, that when there is substantial asymmetry, it may become easier for the leading firm 
or firms to exploit their dominant position. Hence, in this case, although the explanatory 
variable (ASYM) is important and the same for all practices, the sign is just the opposite for 
practices that qualify as abuses of dominant position. In order to take this into account in the 
econometric model, we interacted this variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the 
practice was an abuse of dominant position (ADP, see below).  
There is no direct measure of firm asymmetry. However EUROSTAT’s Structural Business 
Statistics
9 contains information on the number of firms in a certain size bracket
10 and the total 
value-added of firms of a certain size. In order to determine the approximate asymmetry 
between firms in one industry, we computed the average size of a firm in each of the brackets 
(average value added per firm), as well as the average size of the industry and we used the 
standard deviation as a measure of asymmetry. The larger the standard deviation, the greater 
the asymmetry. Since average size differs greatly from one industry to another, the standard 
deviation also varies considerably, simply as a result of the size effect. To take this into 
account, we used a normalized measure of asymmetry across NACE3 with mean equal to 0 and 
variance equal to 1. 
Entry Barriers (CAP): The harder it is for new firms to enter the market, the more likely it is for 
a practice that breaches competition to take place. We used a measure of capital intensity as a 
proxy for entry barriers. 
                                              
9 The dataset used in this paper corresponds to 2001. 
10 We have 11 different size brackets.  
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There are several data sources that provide information on the capital intensity of industries at 
the 3-digit Nace level. Our data analysis used the following ones: European Commission (1994) 
and Peneder’s WIFO taxonomy (1999). Both sets of data have been extensively used in the 
industrial organization literature and by the European Commission (see the EC’s 2000 and 2001 
Competitiveness Reports). 
Product Differentiation (RD and ADV): The more differentiated the products in an industry, the 
less likely it is for anti-competitive behavior to take place, since companies focus competition 
on characteristics other than price and the diminished rivalry on price can lead to less need for 
softening competition through increased coordination between companies. Nevertheless, 
product differentiation is very difficult to measure. These general statements apply to a world 
where products are “exogenously” differentiated, and in such a case one would expect a 
negative relationship between the likelihood of anti-competitive practices and measures of 
product differentiation.  
A broader model or product differentiation, however, should take into account the fact that 
differentiation is in itself a source of market power and is therefore developed endogenously by 
companies through investment in R&D and advertising assets (see Sutton, 1991). R&D 
investment often leads to new product introductions, and advertising helps differentiate 
existing products and services. Both investments in intangibles involve different degrees of 
sunk costs and can become important entry barriers, thus potentially leading to the observance 
of less competitive behavior. As Sutton (1991) has shown, through what is known as 
endogenous sunk-cost competition, both R&D and advertising competition can lead to 
concentration in a given industry, and it is therefore not surprising that R&D and advertising 
spending were both considered good proxies for entry barriers in the past.  
In practice this means that we introduced both R&D and advertising intensity as independent 
regressors. However, we also interacted them with the measure of industry concentration. Given 
a certain level of concentration, the higher the level of R&D (or advertising intensity) the lower 
the impact of concentration on the probability of anti-competitive practice, since concentration 
is the result of strong competition in sunk advertising and R&D spending.
11  
Demand Growth (DEM): we expected demand growth to be positively related to the probability 
of anti-competitive behavior (Ivaldi et al., 2003), mainly because, for a fixed number of players, 
in a growing market the profits from deviating today are small compared with the costs of 
being punished in the future, when the market is much bigger and, hence, when the potential 
profits from colluding could be much greater.
12 The data used came from the Structural 
Business Statistics (SBS) produced by Eurostat. The period considered was 1999-2001.  
Trade Exposure (TRADE): In general, we expected likelihood of anti-competitive behavior to be 
lower in industries where imports represented an important part of total domestic consumption. 
To analyze this issue, we constructed a variable TRADE that measured the weight on extra-EU 
                                              
11 The interaction did not come out as statistically significant for the case of advertising which, as discussed in the 
results, may indicate that this variable captures mostly product differentiation and not barriers to entry. 
12 Notice, however, that this conclusion from the literature is subject to the assumption of a fixed number of players. 
It could very well be the case that entry (and hence the likely breakdown of collusion) is easier in growing markets. 
In order to control for this, it was also important to consider entry barriers in our econometric specification since in 
a market with low barriers, demand growth might encourage entry and obstruct collusion.  
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imports on EU-wide apparent domestic consumption (i.e., production minus exports plus 
imports). This variable was constructed with data from Unido (production data) and Eurostat 
(trade). The figures corresponded to 2000. 
4.2.3. Variables for the Sample Selection Equation 
In order to determine the variables to be used for the sample selection equation, we had 
conversations with the relevant Commission officials. Apparently, most of the decisions to 
investigate are motivated by leniency applications (30%) and complaints (60%), with ex-officio 
investigations representing only 10%. Moreover, only about 10% of complaints are in fact 
investigated. So the right question to ask to determine whether a sample selection bias occurs is 
what determines leniency applications, and what determines complaints and their acceptance. 
As for leniency applications, the leniency regime has been in place since 1996, and was beefed 
up in 2002, thus substantially increasing the number of applications. Our data set included the 
period from January 1999 to February 2004 and therefore probably included a substantial 
number of cases investigated due to leniency applications. However, the industry-level 
determining factors of a leniency application were bound to be very similar to the industry-
level determining factors of the existence of a cartel. It was therefore very unlikely that we 
would find a new and different regressor through the leniency route that could be used in the 
sample selection equation, given that the main determining factors of a cartel were already 
included as explanatory variables in Equation 1.  
As for the determining factors of complaints, in general we were likely to observe complaints 
precisely in industries where there were industry conditions that facilitated infringements. 
Therefore, the key point was: when did the Commission accept a complaint? First of all, many 
complaints were rejected because they were poorly drafted. Second, complaints were rejected if 
they did not have “a Community interest”. What this meant was that the size of the industry in 
question, or the geographical scope, implied that the infringement (if it existed) was rather 
small or was geographically limited, and could be dealt with by national courts. These 
determining factors were well captured by the variables industry size (SIZE) and importance of 
intra-EU trade in the sector (INTRA). The size of the industry was measured as turnover (source: 
SBS from Eurostat, year 2001), and the importance of intra-EU trade was measured as intra-EU 
imports over total EU apparent consumption (same source and year as TRADE). 
Another important factor was of a sectoral nature. All other things being equal, the Commission 
may have reacted more favorably to complaints coming from end users, as compared to 
intermediate consumers. In practice, this may have implied that consumer-oriented industries 
(i.e., those in which advertising played a more important role) may have been subject to greater 
scrutiny. In order to capture this consumer-goods effect, we included an advertising variable 
(ADV). 
The nature of the infringement was another criteria for the decision to consider the complaint, 
and in particular cartel behavior was almost always prosecuted. To capture this possibility, we 
included a case-based variable to capture the cartel effect (the variable ART defined below). 
Finally, when accepting a complaint, the Commission also considers broad information about 
the market, but this is no different from what is done in the ex-officio procedure. 
Legal Basis (ART): For 885 out of 993 cases, the information provided by the EC also included 
the legal basis used. This could be Article 81, 82 or other articles in the EC Treaty, or a 
combination of more than one article. In 68% of the cases, Article 81 was the only one 
considered, whereas in 9% of them, the legal basis included both Articles 81 and 82. On the  
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other hand, only 10% of the cases include Article 82 as the only legal basis considered, but 
28% of the cases included Article 82 in their legal basis.  
It is important to include this characteristic as an explanatory factor of the decision to 
investigate because an investigation under a certain article implies that the Commission already 
assumes that certain characteristics exist that may have lead to a certain problem. We included 
a dummy which took the value 1 if Article 81 had been applied, and 0 otherwise, because this 
captured the idea that the Commission was more likely to investigate cases that could 
potentially lead to the prosecution of cartel-type behavior. 
In short, after examining in detail the Commission’s decision to investigate, we concluded that 
the sample selection equation should not only include variables capturing size (SIZE) and intra-
EU trade (INTRA), but also an advertising variable that accounted for the consumer-goods effect 
(ADV), and a case-based variable to capture the cartel effect (ART).  
5. Results 
5.1. The Empirical Model 
The econometric specification we used for the regression on the probability of detecting anti-
competitive behavior (equation 1) was as follows.  
P = F (β0 + β1 EFF + β2 ADP + β3 CONC + β4 ASYM + β5 (ASYM*ADP) + β6 CAP + 
+ β7 RD + β8 (RD*CONC) + β9 ADV + β10 DEM + β11 TRADE) 
The above specification reflects the fact that the relevant industry-level explanatory variables 
suggested by the industrial organization literature are the same for all the anti-competitive 
practices. However, it also allows us to control for the fact that these characteristics can have 
different effects in different types of practices. In this respect, the positive signs that correspond 
to concentration, capital intensity and R&D intensity conform with the explanations provided 
above with regard to their inclusion in the regression. And the same goes for the negative sign 
on demand growth and trade. We also included the interaction of CONC and RD. The 
interpretation of this last parameter was as follows. β3 + β8  RD gave us how the probability of 
anti-competitive practice changed with an increase in CONC and β7 + β8 CONC indicated how 
the probability of anti-competitive practice changed with an increase in R&D intensity. We 
expected β3 and β7 to be positive, but parameter β8  to be negative.  
This implies that the effect of increased concentration on the probability of anti-competitive 
behavior is lower in high R&D-intensive industries, because part of that concentration reflects 
endogenous sunk-cost competition. For the same reason, the anti-competitive effect of 
increased R&D intensity (through the creation of entry barriers) should be lower in concentrated 
industries. 
We also included practice-specific parameters. As explained above, we expected the parameters 
for both EFF and ADP to be negative. Given a set of industry determining factors, the 
likelihood of anti-competitive practices was lower whenever efficiency considerations were 
taken into account. These practice-specific parameters also allowed us to control for the fact 
that some of the industry-level explanatory variables could have different effects depending on  
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the anti-competitive practice we were analyzing. Consider the effect of asymmetry. In general it 
was negative. However, it could turn out to be positive when we considered cases of abuse of 
dominant position (ADP). This implied that even if β4 was negative, we expected (β4 + β5) ) to 
be positive. Table 3 summarizes the signs expected for each parameter. 
 
Table 3 











5.2. Description of the Data and Results 
Data 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics corresponding to the main variables used in the 
econometric analysis, with a focus on the industry determining factors of the probability of 
detecting an anti-competitive practice and the probability that a particular industry is 
investigated. The table reports the averages for the cases involving these sectors 
(manufacturing, telecommunications services and financial intermediation) that were actually 
used in the regression analysis (some cases were discarded because not all explanatory variables 
were available). 
The table also provides the results of the T-test of differences in means, which illustrates the 
fact that the key industry variables did not appear to be significantly different if we considered 
the group of investigated cases and those not investigated. This might indicate that the two 
samples were in fact very similar, in the sense that both of them might have been randomly 
 Regressors  Expected  sign 
β1  Vertical and horizontal practices with 
efficiency justification (EFF) 
Negative 
β2  Abuse of dominant position (ADP)  Negative 
β3  Concentration (CONC)  Positive 
β4  Asymmetry (ASYM)  Negative 
β5  Asymmetry*ADP (ASYM*ADP)  Positive 
β6  Capital intensity (CAP)  Positive 
β7  R&D intensity (RD)  Positive 
β8  R&D intensity*Concentration (RD*CONC)  Negative 
β9  Advertising intensity (ADV)  Uncertain 
β10  Demand growth (DEM)  Positive 
β11  Exposure to extra-EU trade (TRADE)  Negative  
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drawn from the same population. If this was the case, the sample selection problem might be 
less important, as mentioned in the discussion above. 
 
Table 4 
Industry Descriptive Statistics (Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Manufacturing 




















Table 5 also shows the descriptive statistics at the industry level and distinguishes those cases 
in which an anti-competitive practice was detected and those in which no such practice was 
detected. As before, the information is provided for all cases involving the manufacturing 
industry, telecommunications services and financial intermediation sectors that were used in 












CONC (C5) 33.106 32.612 -0.247
13.486 12.874 (0,8052)
ASYM 0.063 0.149 0.605
0.888 1.078 (0,5455)
CAP 18.588 18.454 -0.081
11.321 10.347 (0,9359)
RD 3.934 3.800 -0.310
2.867 2.897 (0,7568)
RD*CONC 131.529 128.715 -0.185
102.221 98.893 (0,8535)
ADV 0.623 0.541 -1.119
0.486 0.502 (0,2643)
DEM 0.138 0.136 -0.097
0.989 0.100 (0,9232)
TRADE 0.163 0.196 1.174
0.184 0.189 (0,2417)
INTRA 0.277 0.273 -0.192
0.137 0.134 (0,8478)
SIZE 160.241 181.113 0.504
258.499 317.888 (0,6150)
ART 0.907 0.934 0.642
0.291 0.250 (0,5216)
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ADV 0.623 0.541 -1.119
0.486 0.502 (0,2643)
DEM 0.138 0.136 -0.097
0.989 0.100 (0,9232)
TRADE 0.163 0.196 1.174
0.184 0.189 (0,2417)
INTRA 0.277 0.273 -0.192
0.137 0.134 (0,8478)
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258.499 317.888 (0,6150)
ART 0.907 0.934 0.642
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CONC (C5) 33.106 32.612 -0.247
13.486 12.874 (0,8052)
ASYM 0.063 0.149 0.605
0.888 1.078 (0,5455)
CAP 18.588 18.454 -0.081
11.321 10.347 (0,9359)
RD 3.934 3.800 -0.310
2.867 2.897 (0,7568)
RD*CONC 131.529 128.715 -0.185
102.221 98.893 (0,8535)
ADV 0.623 0.541 -1.119
0.486 0.502 (0,2643)
DEM 0.138 0.136 -0.097
0.989 0.100 (0,9232)
TRADE 0.163 0.196 1.174
0.184 0.189 (0,2417)
INTRA 0.277 0.273 -0.192
0.137 0.134 (0,8478)
SIZE 160.241 181.113 0.504
258.499 317.888 (0,6150)
ART 0.907 0.934 0.642
0.291 0.250 (0,5216)
None of the means of the two groups of cases was statistically different (at a significance level of 5%). 
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Table 5 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Manufacturing Industries, Telecomunications 
























Table 6 presents the results of the analysis with the estimate of the main model alone 
(specification 1), as well as the main model plus the sample selection equation (specifications 2, 
3 and 4). All regressions were estimated using standard errors corrected for potential 
heterocedasticity problems, given the cross-sectional nature of the database. Several alternative 
specifications for the main equation and the selection were tested and the parameters were 










C5 32.998 33.131 0.049
15.235 13.121 (0,9614)
ASYM -0.036 0.086 0.677
0.870 0.894 (0,4994)
CAP 17.076 18.931 0.809
9.536 11.694 (0,4195)
RD 4.785 3.741 -1.813
3.964 2.533 (0,0717)
RD*C5 156.390 125.879 -1.481
161.161 83.178 (0,1405)
ADV 0.500 0.652 1.548
0.509 0.478 (0,1236)
DEM 0.120 0.142 1.081
0.095 0.100 (0,2815)
TRADE 0.259 0.141 -3.271
0.226 0.167 (0,0013)
EFF 0.467 0.803 3.9511
0.507 0.399 (0,0001)
ADP 0.233 0.121 -1.5909
0.430 0.328 (0,1136)
ASYM*ADP -0.056 0.051 1.3934
0.103 0.413 (0,1654)
INTRA 0.317 0.268 -1.799
0.146 0.134 (0,0739)
SIZE 133.6 166.3 0.625
265.9 257.4 (0,5328)
ART 0.833 0.924 1.553
0.379 0.257 (0,1225)
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15.235 13.121 (0,9614)
ASYM -0.036 0.086 0.677
0.870 0.894 (0,4994)
CAP 17.076 18.931 0.809
9.536 11.694 (0,4195)
RD 4.785 3.741 -1.813
3.964 2.533 (0,0717)
RD*C5 156.390 125.879 -1.481
161.161 83.178 (0,1405)
ADV 0.500 0.652 1.548
0.509 0.478 (0,1236)
DEM 0.120 0.142 1.081
0.095 0.100 (0,2815)
TRADE 0.259 0.141 -3.271
0.226 0.167 (0,0013)
EFF 0.467 0.803 3.9511
0.507 0.399 (0,0001)
ADP 0.233 0.121 -1.5909
0.430 0.328 (0,1136)
ASYM*ADP -0.056 0.051 1.3934
0.103 0.413 (0,1654)
INTRA 0.317 0.268 -1.799
0.146 0.134 (0,0739)
SIZE 133.6 166.3 0.625
265.9 257.4 (0,5328)
ART 0.833 0.924 1.553
0.379 0.257 (0,1225)
Shaded results indicate that the means of the two groups of cases were statistically different (at a significance
level of 5%) 
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The results in Table 6 confirm that the overall fit of the model is quite good: most of the 
parameters were statistically significant and of the expected sign. Given the fact that we were 
considering a cross-section of industries and that the way these industries were defined was 
quite different from the way markets are defined for antitrust purposes, the robustness of the 




















Robust standard errors. Shaded areas indicate that the coefficients were statistically different from zero (at a 
significance levell of 10%). 
 
As expected, the coefficients for EFF and ADP were both negative, indicating that for a given 
set of industry determining factors, when we took into account efficiency considerations, there 
was less likelihood of anti-competitive practices. Moreover, the EFF coefficient was 
significantly more negative than the ADP one. This allowed us to establish a clear ranking 
across the three types of practices regarding their likelihood of leading towards a negative 
decision by the Commission: everything else being equal, the practices most likely to lead to a 
decision of anti-competitive behavior were horizontal ones without an efficiency justification, 
followed by those that could imply abuse of dominant position and, finally, those that could 
have a potential efficiency justification.  
Probit Probits (correcting for sample selection)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error
EFF -1.2299 0.3372 -1.2882 0.3364 -1.2709 0.3327 -1.2739 0.3324 -1.2672 0.3357
ADP -0.7049 0.4201 -0.8426 0.4053 -0.8622 0.3939 -0.8619 0.3947 -0.8621 0.3901
CONC (with c5) 0.0342 0.0207 0.0324 0.0197 0.0346 0.0194 0.0343 0.0194 0.0319 0.0194
ASYM 0.2180 0.2458 0.1143 0.2341 0.1413 0.2245 0.1369 0.2248 0.1271 0.2296
ASYM*ADP -2.9784 0.7878 -2.8002 0.7679 -2.7241 0.7293 -2.7302 0.7303 -2.7145 0.744
CAP -0.0334 0.0359 -0.0310 0.0332 -0.0342 0.0327 -0.0341 0.0329 -0.0291 0.0346
RD 0.1087 0.1351 0.1315 0.1330 0.1375 0.1268 0.1363 0.1273 0.1339 0.1275
RD*CONC -0.0024 0.0034 -0.0031 0.0035 -0.0027 0.0032 -0.0027 0.0032 -0.0027 0.0031
ADV -0.6654 0.3890 -0.5336 0.3597 -0.5709 0.3460 -0.5686 0.3446 -0.05532 0.3527
DEM 6.9213 3.5257 6.1589 3.2829 6.6080 3.2389 6.5590 3.2726 6.0598 3.5927
TRADE 3.6948 1.0530 3.2967 1.0283 3.3432 0.9949 3.2649 1.0236 3.3219 1.1127
_cons -1.9357 0.8074 -1.9720 0.7757 -2.1852 0.7678 -2.1530 0.7650 -2.1345 0.7554
N 163 162 162 162 162
Pseudo R2 0.25
Prob >Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi2 61.15 71.14 80.11 79.84 79.66
Selection equation variables
CONC 0.0102 0.0145 0.0188 0.0070 0.0162 0.0064
ASYM -2.2283 0.9056 -1.4321 0.5287 -1.2379 0.4711
CAP 0.0112 0.0196 -0.0074 0.0080 -0.0078 0.0080
RD -0.0324 0.0857
RD*CONC -0.0011 0.0023
ADV 0.6392 0.2392 0.3932 0.1536 0.4037 0.1537 0.3697 0.1316
DEM -3.1896 1.9497
TRADE -0.2341 0.6155 0.3108 0.4546
INTRA 0.6060 0.9617 1.3184 0.6096 1.4331 0.5710 2.0910 0.4896
ART 0.2269 0.2094 0.2815 0.1706 0.2765 0.1676 0.2807 0.1701
SIZE 0.0066 0.0030 0.0046 0.0018 0.0039 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0002
_cons -1.1700 0.7622 -1.8808 0.5424 -1.6728 0.4819 -0.9103 0.2270
N-censored 119 148 148 157
Chi2 1.03 2.14 2.12 1.15
Prob>chi2 0.3094 0.1438 0.1455 0.2845
Rho 0.4388 0.5338 0.5278 0.5518
Probit Probits (correcting for sample selection)
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ADP -0.7049 0.4201 -0.8426 0.4053 -0.8622 0.3939 -0.8619 0.3947 -0.8621 0.3901
CONC (with c5) 0.0342 0.0207 0.0324 0.0197 0.0346 0.0194 0.0343 0.0194 0.0319 0.0194
ASYM 0.2180 0.2458 0.1143 0.2341 0.1413 0.2245 0.1369 0.2248 0.1271 0.2296
ASYM*ADP -2.9784 0.7878 -2.8002 0.7679 -2.7241 0.7293 -2.7302 0.7303 -2.7145 0.744
CAP -0.0334 0.0359 -0.0310 0.0332 -0.0342 0.0327 -0.0341 0.0329 -0.0291 0.0346
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ADV -0.6654 0.3890 -0.5336 0.3597 -0.5709 0.3460 -0.5686 0.3446 -0.05532 0.3527
DEM 6.9213 3.5257 6.1589 3.2829 6.6080 3.2389 6.5590 3.2726 6.0598 3.5927
TRADE 3.6948 1.0530 3.2967 1.0283 3.3432 0.9949 3.2649 1.0236 3.3219 1.1127
_cons -1.9357 0.8074 -1.9720 0.7757 -2.1852 0.7678 -2.1530 0.7650 -2.1345 0.7554
N 163 162 162 162 162
Pseudo R2 0.25
Prob >Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi2 61.15 71.14 80.11 79.84 79.66
Selection equation variables
CONC 0.0102 0.0145 0.0188 0.0070 0.0162 0.0064
ASYM -2.2283 0.9056 -1.4321 0.5287 -1.2379 0.4711
CAP 0.0112 0.0196 -0.0074 0.0080 -0.0078 0.0080
RD -0.0324 0.0857
RD*CONC -0.0011 0.0023
ADV 0.6392 0.2392 0.3932 0.1536 0.4037 0.1537 0.3697 0.1316
DEM -3.1896 1.9497
TRADE -0.2341 0.6155 0.3108 0.4546
INTRA 0.6060 0.9617 1.3184 0.6096 1.4331 0.5710 2.0910 0.4896
ART 0.2269 0.2094 0.2815 0.1706 0.2765 0.1676 0.2807 0.1701
SIZE 0.0066 0.0030 0.0046 0.0018 0.0039 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0002
_cons -1.1700 0.7622 -1.8808 0.5424 -1.6728 0.4819 -0.9103 0.2270
N-censored 119 148 148 157
Chi2 1.03 2.14 2.12 1.15
Prob>chi2 0.3094 0.1438 0.1455 0.2845
Rho 0.4388 0.5338 0.5278 0.5518 
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Our results also confirmed the fact that anti-competitive practices are more likely to take place 
in more concentrated industries (CONC). The coefficient for ADV was negative or not 
significant, and this fits with the interpretation that this variable is capturing the extent of 
product differentiation, which softens price competition and the incentive to undertake 
restrictive practices. Also, as expected, demand growth (DEM) increased the likelihood of anti-
competitive behavior in the industry.  
There were, however, two regressors that did not present the expected sign: the one 
corresponding to trade exposure and ASYM*ADP. Regarding the coefficient for TRADE, it is 
apparent that the selected variable was probably a very crude measure of the competitive 
pressure exerted by foreign competition,
13 and it therefore probably captured other variables 
that were omitted.  
As indicated in Section 4.2.2, we expected the ASYM*ADP coefficient to be positive. In fact, 
when we considered only manufacturing industries, this was exactly the case (see the results in 
Appendix B). However, when we included telecommunications services (NACE 642) and 
financial intermediation (NACE 651 and 652), the sign of the coefficient became negative, 
which indicated that, given a certain asymmetry level, in these industries an abuse of dominant 
position is more easily tolerated since it may naturally be explained by economics and the 
history of the industries. For instance, in telecommunications services the cost structure of 
some of its players and the regulatory tradition explain why certain firms play a dominant role 
in the market. Something similar happens with the financial intermediation industry, where 
historical reasons have allowed some firms to play a leading role on their domestic market. 
The results were also as expected for the selection equation. The Commission was more likely to 
evaluate a case if it affected a large industry (SIZE). It also appeared to be more inclined to 
examine one if it directly affected the welfare of the end consumer (captured by ADV) or if 
there was some concern about a cartel (ART).  
Finally, the results of the probits that corrected for sample selection were very consistent with 
the ones that did not correct for it. This seems to indicate that the problem of sample selection 
was not important. This view is, in fact, reinforced by the analysis of the descriptive statistics 
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Altogether, therefore, it is not surprising that only minor changes 
were observed in the magnitude of the parameters when comparing models with and without 
sample section. 
Interpretation of the Results 
Since we estimated a probit model, the parameters of Table 6 could not be readily interpreted in 
terms of the magnitude of the effect of changes in the explanatory variables on the probability 
of detecting anti-competitive behavior. In this model, the change in the probability caused by a 
change in any of the coefficients depended on where we started. As a starting point, we 
evaluated the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable at the mean value 
of the data (Table 7) and reported on the new sample mean value of the dependent variable (the 
estimated probability) if there was a change of one standard deviation for each of the 
explanatory variables.  
                                              
13 It does not include, for example, the role of non-EU firms based in the EU and therefore the role of intra-firm 
trade.  
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As expected, the model predicted that the probability of detecting anti-competitive behavior by 
the Commission was higher when cases were considered with a potential horizontal practice 
without efficiency justification, followed by those in which there was a possibility of abuse of 
dominant position and, finally, those where an efficiency justification existed. In fact, the 
Commission was seven times more likely to decide against a horizontal practice than against 
one with a potential efficiency justification. With regard to horizontal practices, Table 7 clearly 
shows that the strongest quantitative impact on the likelihood of detecting anti-competitive 
behavior came from changes in extra-EU trade and concentration variables. It is also 
interesting to note that the impact of the advertising and CAP variables, which work in the 
opposite direction, was also very important (however, the interpretation of the magnitude also 
had to take into account the statistical significance of the coefficient and the one for CAP was 
not significantly different from zero in Table 6, so the parameter was less reliable). This 
highlights the fact that it is important to assess market-structure variables and take into 
account the nature of competition in each industry, while making sure that the effect is 
properly recognized of product differentiation and competition through new product 
development as factors that soften the tendency towards anti-competitive practices. 
If we consider practices with potential efficiency justifications and the abuse of dominant position, 
the most important independent variables were more or less the same, but it is worth pointing out 
that in most cases changes in the independent variable appeared to have a relatively stronger effect 
on the estimated probability than what happened in the benchmark case.  
Table 7 









This paper has described the analysis of the decisions made by the European Commission 
regarding the existence of anti-competitive practices, based on a set of relevant industry-level 
variables. Our main objective was to determine whether Commission decisions follow what the 
predictions of the economic literature. The results of this paper suggest that, by and large, this 
seems to be the case. As expected, the Commission is more inclined to rule against cases that 
involve horizontal practices than against those that imply a potential abuse of dominant 
position or a practice that could have efficiency justifications. Moreover, as expected from the 
economics literature, the Commission is more likely to rule against a practice that involves a 
highly concentrated industry or an industry with high demand growth. However, it is less likely 
to rule against a sector with considerable advertising. 
Increasing one Std. Deviation of:
At the mean CONC (C5) ASYM CAP RD RD*CONC ADV TRADE
Prob. of horizontal 
practice without
efficiency justification




4.85% 11.70% 6.30% 2.07% 10.38% 2.68% 2.68% 14.69%
Prob. abuse dominant
position
9.18% 19.22% 11.31% 4.36% 17.36% 5.48% 5.48% 23.27%
Probabilities estimated by evaluating specification (4) from Table 6 at the mean value of the cases studied (in Table 4).
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Our results also confirm that the Commission is more likely to tolerate a potential abuse of 
dominant position given a certain asymmetry level in sectors such as financial intermediation 
and telecommunications services, where such an asymmetry may be easily explained by the 
economics and the regulatory history of these industries.  
Moreover, the estimate was undertaken by taking fully into consideration the fact that there 
might be biases in the way the Commission decides on which cases to investigate. In other 
words, the effect of some determining factors of finding an antitrust breach could be due not to 
a fundamental relation, but rather to the bias caused by the way the Commission decides on the 
industries it will investigate. Our analysis confirms that the Commission appears to be more 
likely to investigate cases related to large industries, sectors that affect the end consumer and 
situations that could involve a cartel. However, the results also show that the sample selection 
bias does not appear to be very significant and it does not have a major impact on the probit 
coefficients.  
There are, inevitably, some caveats in our analysis. Two points, in particular, are of concern. 
The first one involves our definition of the product market. In this analysis, we considered the 
relevant market to be the one corresponding to the industry as defined by its 3-digit NACE 
code. This definition was needed if we wanted to measure most of our variables, particularly 
concentration and trade. Unfortunately, due to data constraints, we were not able to use 
alternative product market definitions.  
A second possible criticism of this study is that we did not cover all services due to data 
availability. Nevertheless, the good performance of the model for all the sectors considered 
provides some confidence regarding the ability to apply the methodology to a broader range of 
industries, even if the information available at the sector level is more limited.  
Finally, it would be extremely interesting to undertake a similar study that includes firm-
specific information in addition to industry characteristics. This would allow us to take into 
account the effect on antitrust infringements of the actual competitive interaction of companies 
in the marketplace.  
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APPENDIX A 
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- for the countries with availability of
data NACE 65
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APPENDIX B 



















Robust standard errors. Shaded areas indicate that the coefficients were statistically different from zero (at a significance 
level of 10%). 
* The Chi2 value was quite low and, hence, the outcome we obtained by correcting for selection was not very different 
from the one we obtained without correction. The Rho value was also quite close to 1, thus indicating that correction for 
selection might not have been needed here.   
 
Probit Probits (correcting for sample selection)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error
EFF -1.3950 0.4044 -1.2643 0.7065 -1.1910 0.2930 -1.3052 0.3850
ADP 9.1684 5.0635 8.2890 4.1702 8.8042 3.9435 8.2581 4.1389
CONC (with c5) 0.0382 0.0211 0.0364 0.0211 0.0364 0.0184 0.0310 0.0184
ASYM -0.3546 0.3646 -0.5001 0.2954 -0.4625 0.2802 -0.5143 0.3336
ASYM*ADP 51.6438 28.0650 50.0703 22.0866 50.0699 21.2934 47.6616 22.7779
CAP -0.0843 0.0447 -0.0777 0.0604 -0.0761 0.0327 -0.0555 0.0484
RD 0.0967 0.1557 0.0995 0.1452 0.0889 0.1480 0.1035 0.1403
RD*CONC -0.0022 0.0037 -0.0016 0.0037 -0.0014 0.0033 -0.0019 0.0031
ADV -0.8728 0.4115 -0.6968 0.3598 -0.6542 0.3414 -0.6713 0.3648
DEM 6.3783 3.4662 4.9896 3.6326 5.2082 2.6432 4.6260 2.8036
TRADE 3.7293 0.9764 2.6782 1.1192 2.7356 0.6735 3.0281 0.9406
_cons -1.2071 0.8764 -1.4730 0.8992 -1.5914 0.7266 -1.6295 0.8145
N 138 137 137 137
Pseudo R2 0.33
Prob >Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi2 47.07 41.69 59.39 46.53
Selection equation variables
CONC 0.0278 0.0089 0.0291 0.0083
ASYM -0.8542 0.4572 -0.9315 0.3453
CAP -0.0580 0.0211 -0.0578 0.0187
RD
RD*CONC
ADV 0.4350 0.1593 0.4224 0.1611 0.3711 0.1439
DEM
TRADE -0.1726 0.5844
INTRA 2.6686 0.8258 2.5952 0.7854 2.8882 0.6963
ART 0.3720 0.1806 0.3745 0.2269 0.4144 0.2317
SIZE 0.0022 0.0026 0.0027 0.0018 -0.0017 0.0006
_cons -1.4393 0.6385 -1.5387 0.4953 -1.1525 0.3044
N-censored 110 110 119
Chi2 0.17 0.39 1.92
Prob>Chi2  0.6782 0.5345 0.1659
Rho 0.9881 0.5278 0.8195
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